



The Duke of Newcastle and the Diplomatic Revolution, 1753–1757: A Historical Revision

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ABSTRACT

Drawing on a diverse array of archival and secondary sources, this analysis examines the role of Thomas Pelham Holles, First Duke of Newcastle, against the background of the famous Reversal of Alliances that ushered in the Seven Years War. Contrary to historical tradition, Newcastle showed an admirable grasp of finance, politics, and diplomacy—a precondition of the political stability that facilitated Britain's successful pursuit of military operations during the war. Unlike most noble contemporaries, with a sound understanding of European/colonial developments, Newcastle was capable of pursuing coherent policies with intelligence and resolution. In a political system that relied heavily on social connexions and diplomatic ritual, Newcastle performed as well as any minister could hope; in an extremely dynamic international environment, contending with dubious allies, implacable enemies, and the vicissitudes of military fortune, he conceived, negotiated, and executed policies that raised necessary funds and sent British forces around the globe on an unprecedented scale. This should be remembered when assessing his historical reputation.

On 28 August 1753, on advice from colonial governors in North America, Britain's secretary of state, Robert D'Arcy, Fourth Earl of Holderness,¹ authorised force against what appeared to be deliberate French aggression.² From 1754 to 1757, the fallout from this order impelled a steady yet reluctant cycle of escalation in North America and the Atlantic. As leaders in Westminster and Versailles scrambled to prepare for an expanded war, their erstwhile allies effected a reversal of alliances: Britain and Hanover became reconciled with Prussia; the houses of Bourbon and Habsburg ended a quarter-millennium of dynastic rivalry. Whilst rightly crediting the leaders of Eastern Europe for their diplomatic initiative and creativity, scholars of this Diplomatic Revolution have perhaps been quick—arguably too quick—to dismiss the significance of Holderness's notional superior. He was Britain's *de facto* chief diplomat, northern secretary, and later first lord of the Treasury, Thomas Pelham-Holles, First Duke of Newcastle, during what became the bleakest and most tangled crisis of his many years in office.

In some cases, the criticism is justified—Newcastle’s frenetic fussiness, his vacillation on matters of policy, his inability to control unruly subordinates, and his occasional flights into diplomatic fantasy. The same scholarship, however, fails to account for two considerations in Newcastle’s favour. First, historians have generally overlooked the various pressures under which he operated, pressures that far exceeded those placed on any other European leader at the time—with the possible exception of Prussia’s King Frederick II. Second, although historians often receive caution against judging actions by their results, it is nonetheless true that Newcastle’s insights during this period, and the policies they informed, began setting the stage for Britain’s ultimate success in the Seven Years War.

This analysis fits into the growing genre of quasi-biographical scholarship on the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756. In his *History of the Seven Years War*, the King of Prussia penned one of the first accounts of the Revolution.³ It appears again alongside several voluminous studies of the Seven Years War written over the next 150 years, culminating in Richard Waddington’s *Louis XV et le Renversement des Alliances* and five volume *Guerre de Sept Ans*.⁴ A few articles appeared in the intervening years before 1989.⁵ Since then, two more books have appeared in German on the reversal of alliances: Lothar Schilling centring on the Austrian chancellor, Wenzel Anton, Prince of Kaunitz-Rietberg, and René Hanke assessing Saxony’s state chancellor, Heinrich von Brühl.⁶ Overall, these works—and Herbert Kaplan’s on Russia and the genesis of the Seven Years War—mirror the relatively small historiography on British leadership during this period represented by David Bayne Horn on Newcastle.⁷ Whilst not directly contending with the narratives of Frederick, Waddington, Kaplan, Schilling, or Hanke, this exegesis overturns the verdict of Horn and his successors. It does so by deepening the narrative of Newcastle’s activities, not merely as a diplomat, but also as a minister concerned with parliamentary politics, interactions with the Crown, elite vested interests, the effective administration of British government finance, and Imperial/colonial governance.⁸

With the benefit of hindsight, modern historians have viewed the Diplomatic Revolution primarily as an Austrian initiative, although not without at least some influence from Saxony.⁹ They have argued that it came as a reasonable outgrowth of various international pressures on Vienna dating from the beginning of the eighteenth century, and that the reversal of alliances served the Habsburg Monarchy’s long-term interests.¹⁰ Other scholars, however, have reconstructed this historical episode in a different way, examining the day-to-day correspondence found in state records and personal papers, using diplomatic micro-history to reveal the “kaleidoscopic” instability in European international politics.¹¹ Whereas the ministers in Europe’s capitals certainly took account of systemic forces, the volatility of relations both within and between courts tended to militate

against a strict adherence to long-term plans, however well conceived. The changes in Russia in 1762, alone, well illustrate this point: Tsarina Elizabeth's hatred for Prussia ended with her long-expected death in January; Peter III suddenly switched from war to alliance with the same Power by May; and an equally sudden palace coup in July brought another change of leaders and a Russo–Prussian entente.¹² Together with dramatic changes of leadership and policy in Britain and Spain at the same time, European international relations appeared so chaotic in 1762 that they perhaps constituted a second “diplomatic revolution.”¹³ Whatever historians may seek to explain by international systems and associated theories, they would be hard-pressed to describe how the chaos of 1762 or the play of military fortune that informed the intervening campaigns of the Seven Years War might have been anticipated in 1756.

For as much as contingency played a role in the international relations of the eighteenth century, officials in Europe's capitals endeavoured nonetheless to situate their states within a relatively stable international framework. Enmeshed in Enlightenment ideologies that placed a premium on order and reason, they invariably viewed their own national primacy as both rational and natural, and so perceived dark design and irrationality in attempts, however indirect, to upset the order that they wished to impose.¹⁴ Leaders thus strove to analyse the ebb and flow of European politics in such a way as to advance their particular states to the height of glory, power, influence, and security, the last of which was of paramount concern. Hence, the evolution of a self-styled “political algebra” by Kaunitz—a system of reasoning by which he sought to manipulate the known variables of international relations to anticipate or minimise the unexpected.¹⁵ Moreover, the policies and geopolitical reasoning of Frederick, Newcastle, and a succession of unnamed ministers in Versailles, who operated on broadly similar philosophical principles.¹⁶

Although others certainly played important roles, notably Tsarina Elizabeth, Brühl, and the astute yet largely impotent Duke of Belle-Isle in France,¹⁷ the most common *foci* of Diplomatic Revolution scholarship have been Kaunitz, Frederick, and Newcastle. Even though the first two have endured their share of criticism, both have also come out relatively well in studies of their period.¹⁸ Influenced by contemporary pundits, satirists, and political detractors, however, modern scholars have traditionally dismissed Newcastle as a non-entity.¹⁹ To quote the duke's only biographer, “he was ... unable to conceive broad plans and tended to use much of his power ineffectually, almost aimlessly,” displaying “a tendency to respond to waxing difficulties with waning flexibility.”²⁰ He has received some rehabilitation in recent years, not least from revisionists seeking to tip the historiographical balance against his famous partner in administration from 1757 to 1761, William Pitt the Elder;²¹ but his diplomatic manoeuvres on the eve of the Seven Years War continue to be seen as unimaginative, ineptly executed, and

hopelessly out of touch with international realities.²² Not only as diplomat, however, but also as domestic politician and manager of the colonies, and a correspondent with aristocrats and notables both at home and in foreign lands, Newcastle has received limited and generally unenthusiastic attention for the conduct of his ministry and opposition up to June 1757.²³ All of these writings, however—not even his biography—consider how he handled these pressures and commitments *at once*. Despite his obvious shortcomings—a timeless human trait—he was a more astute, complex, and significant figure than has been realised.

Part of the problem with the historiography lies in its uneven treatment of the political and personal demands on the three men in question. Frederick, as King of Prussia, certainly had his share of obligations, and his irritability and fatigue as head of the Prussian state and army manifest themselves both clearly and often in his correspondence during the war.²⁴ However, he also inherited loyal and generally able subordinates,²⁵ and as an enlightened absolute monarch, he could reasonably count on retaining his kingship. Particularly from the standpoint of foreign observers, Kaunitz also seemed assured of retaining his position, so long as he retained the favour of Empress Maria Theresa and highly connected political elites.²⁶ In London, Newcastle had no such assurances. His tenure depended on the distribution of cabinet offices; his ability to work with other influential ministers and various powerful factions at court; his management of Parliament; the success and popularity—reported in the active and often highly critical British press—of military, maritime, diplomatic, and colonial initiatives attributed to him as nominal leader of the ministry. Moreover, he had to retain the favour of Britain's King George II, who doubled as Elector of Hanover. Balancing all of these commitments alongside foreign policy and grand strategy deliberations, Newcastle unsurprisingly sometimes appeared troubled, frenzied, fatigued, and indecisive in correspondence with his closest colleagues, friends, and intimates.²⁷

Although clarification of the pressures under which Newcastle operated may not vindicate his conduct, it may at least begin to explain some of the shifts in diplomatic initiative from London and Versailles to Vienna, St. Petersburg, Berlin, and even Dresden.²⁸ Conversely, a deeper appreciation of Newcastle's responses to these pressures begin to reveal a minister whose strategic and political instincts have been grossly underestimated. Even then, however, perfection is too much to expect from any man, let alone a minister operating under so many conflicting pressures in both domestic and international spheres—arenas barely stable or manageable at the best of times.²⁹ For Britain in the mid-eighteenth century, someone of Newcastle's insights, savvy, sensitivity, and social graces was about the best for which the island kingdom might have hoped, and victory in the Seven Years War, despite his mistakes in the conflict's later stages, bears witness to his sagacity and poise during the dark days of the Diplomatic Revolution.

Although the reversal of alliances in 1756 claims many origins, it has been customary for historians to date the beginning of the Diplomatic Revolution from 18 October 1748, when delegates to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle signed a treaty of the same name and ended the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748). Whilst France and Britain had broken even and exchanged colonial conquests that extended from Madras, India to Maritime Canada, Frederician Prussia emerged as a clear winner in the war, taking the rich province of Silesia from Maria Theresa's Austria. Within six months, the empress convened her own conference of ministers to decide the future of Austrian policy and approved proposals contained in Kaunitz's long *Denkschrift* of 25 March 1749.³⁰ As the former governor of the Austrian Netherlands and delegate at Aix-la-Chapelle, he had been impressed with France's military and diplomatic performance during the war, having experienced first-hand the inadequacy of existing arrangements with Britain and the Dutch Republic. Britain, too, failed to see the Anglo–Austrian connexion as a viable factor in international politics. Hence, post-war policy debates in both London and Vienna occurred in the context of mutual disillusionment, false hopes, and broken promises—a situation calling for a detached reassessment of current opportunities and future needs, together with a pragmatic, flexible responsiveness to changing political realities. The Anglo–Austrian partnership thus mirrored the fragility of most eighteenth century alliances, belying the notion that nature or tradition prescribed any particular international order. Following Brühl's lead, Kaunitz suggested that the empress reduce her dependence on fiscal and military aid from existing allies and, instead, pursue a more independent policy highlighted by *détente* if not alliance with France. The proposals remained stillborn through 1753, however, as lingering threats of a new war in Europe appeared to recommend adherence to the existing international system.³¹ At best, Kaunitz could only promote a *Mittelweg* policy, nominally maintaining commitments to Britain but leaving open the potential for *rapprochement* with France.³² It was not Frederick, however, but the actions of British and French colonists in North America that ultimately enabled Kaunitz to follow his original plans.

Although neither government cared to admit it openly, both Austria and Prussia in wartime depended in some measure on help from the outside. The continuing threat of war between the two states after 1748 therefore appeared to re-enforce existing arrangements; neither would risk isolation in the face of a coherent enemy alliance.³³ If, however, Anglo–French tensions appeared to promise a war between those two states first, then not only Austria and Prussia, but also Russia, Spain, the Dutch Republic, and even Saxony, acquired the ability to negotiate their terms.³⁴ Thus, whilst continental strategists prepared for the next European war, ministers and diplomats as far removed as St. Petersburg kept at least one eye trained on the far side of the Atlantic.³⁵ Thanks to ambitious opportunists and highly placed

speculators on both sides of the Anglo–French frontier in colonial North America, their hopes were not disappointed.

Herein, then, lay the real and proximate origins of the Diplomatic Revolution, even more than the rise of Frederician Prussia. Without the opportunities opened by the rising tensions between Westminster and Versailles, the other courts of Europe could go little farther than the *Mittelweg* that defined both Austrian and Prussian foreign policy after 1752. With them, it was not only Austria and Prussia, but all the courts of Europe—and several political entities in the American frontier zones³⁶—who sensed an opportunity to determine their own fates. Nor was it simply one fault line in North America that adversely impacted Anglo–French relations, but several simultaneously, stretching in a gigantic arc from Nova Scotia through New York and at least as far south as the Virginia frontier. Although the root causes may have been the same, the various colonial and metropolitan governments identified up to three distinct zones of conflict, all of which appeared to call for immediate resolution.³⁷

For several years after 1749, British and French officials could cover their disputes under the official rubric of negotiations, and the violence was little enough as not to attract much attention from metropolitan Europe. As Virginia and Pennsylvania traders ventured farther west, however, and as high officials in both colonies acquired a financial stake in westward expansion, French officials in Canada panicked in the face of what they perceived as a British colonial hydra. Receiving alarming letters of their own from Lieutenant Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia, in particular, British officials—including Newcastle—acted in their turn. Following advice from Lord Halifax, president of the Board of Trade, the cabinet agreed on 21 August 1753 to authorise the use of force on the Ohio frontier.³⁸ After some hesitation, Holdernes drafted the final wording a week later, instructing the colonial governors that

if, notwithstanding your requisition (for the French to stop building forts and to leave the Ohio frontier zone), they should still persist, you are then to draw forth the armed force of the province, and to use your best endeavours to repell[sic] force by force.³⁹

Because of these orders and their abuse by colonial officials, the dynamic of international relations throughout the Atlantic world soon turned on its head.

In December 1753, the young George Washington and 11 ragged, starving, and frozen companions failed to impress French garrison commanders on the Pennsylvania frontier. By their failure, Washington's small party allowed Dinwiddie to act on the more belligerent article of his instructions, whilst the broadcasting of British demands justified the hostile ambitions of French officials in Canada. By summer 1754, the American frontier witnessed levels of violence unseen since 1748. European Powers began to pay attention by

the end of the year and took even greater interest when it became clear that both sides would send regular troops for the campaign of 1755.

While 4,000 troops made the transatlantic voyage in 1755, Newcastle tried to restrict their scale by way of a further escalation—calling in the services of 17 ships of the line under admirals Edward Boscawen and Francis Holbourne.⁴⁰ The combination of this escalation and bungling on both sides appeared to portend a further expansion of the colonial war and its eventual spread across the Atlantic. By the middle of the year, French officials began to pressure Frederick for action in Europe—which he refused—alongside France's other major continental allies in Madrid, opening prospects for an isolated colonial conflict. Bolstered in principle by George's II's timely visit to his electoral dominions in Hanover, British envoys in Vienna and The Hague called for declarations that they would carry out their obligations under the Third Treaty of the Barrier. That is to say, proclaiming that they were willing to defend themselves and dependent territories against French aggression on the continent of Europe.⁴¹

In the event, the leading counsels in Vienna refused, seeing a very different opportunity than that presented in London. Where British leaders saw a brilliant prospect of winning the war in America by isolating France in Europe, Kaunitz and Maria Theresa perceived a golden opportunity to force the British into an alliance against their *bête noire*, Prussia. In a diplomatic manoeuvre that some British ministers saw as a breach of diplomatic decorum and plain common sense,⁴² Austrian ministers chose to negotiate with boots on the ground: they refused to carry out existing obligations under the Barrier treaty until British diplomats concluded a new and implicitly anti-Prussian alliance with Russia. This treaty bolstered Netherlands defence against France. Newcastle in particular saw Austria's proposals as means to rehabilitate the Barrier alliance, but perceived by July a viable alternative of protecting the king's Hanoverian dominions with Electoral troops backed by subsidised allies in northern Germany.⁴³

A key component in this new conception was an unexpected Prussian overture, indicating Frederick's interest in a convention of neutrality.⁴⁴ Although British ministers strove to remain silent, Austrian leaders correctly guessed at Anglo-Prussian intrigues by August and renewed their own overtures to France by way of Madame Pompadour, chief mistress of King Louis XV.⁴⁵ As the Austrian negotiations stalled and leaders in Vienna braced for their own risk of diplomatic isolation, British talks with Russia and Prussia went ahead. Whilst confusion surrounded the Russian ratification of their subsidy treaty with Britain—signed on 30 September—Anglo-Prussian relations steadily improved, culminating in the Convention of Westminster of 16 January 1756.⁴⁶

British and Prussian leaders presented their treaty as a mere neutrality—and it was little more than that in fact; both French and Austrian leaders took

it as a fundamental betrayal of their international aims. Ministers at Versailles, cowed by the prospect of a renewed Barrier alliance with Prussia now in tow, took the radical step of proposing maritime operations against Europe's foremost naval Power—threatening an invasion of the British Isles but, in fact, landing 15,000 troops on Minorca.⁴⁷ Only slowly did it dawn on French diplomatists that they held in prospect a substantial alliance with Austria, which would allow both Powers to pursue their respective wars without significant interference from the outside, and maybe even a little help. Although the Austrians refused to turn against their former British allies, they asked only 24,000 troops or their equivalent in specie from France for their anticipated war against Prussia, leaving the remainder of French resources for the maritime theatre.⁴⁸

Thus the First Treaty of Versailles was signed on 1 May 1756, announced a month later to the various courts of Europe. British and Prussian leaders soon experienced their own shock and dismay, particularly as Elizabeth began to hint at her intention to join the Austrians in a coming anti-Prussian war. As British ministers stood paralysed, Frederick panicked and brought Europe to the brink of war in July 1756. The British envoy in Berlin, Andrew Mitchell, deterred him: but his suggestion for diplomatic means delayed the outbreak of hostilities for a mere six weeks. As Prussian armies crossed the frontier into Saxony and Bohemia on 28 August 1756, they completed a reversal of alliances that had been set in train precisely three years earlier.

Amongst the earlier writings on Newcastle, a witticism from the era of Robert Walpole's ministry (1721–1742) quipped that the former performed all the work, the latter received all the credit. At least by its repute, the same might equate of the ministry that Newcastle shared with Pitt during the Seven Years War (1757–1761).⁴⁹ A workaholic and flatterer at heart, Newcastle strove—often beyond his means⁵⁰—to maintain a good *social* reputation at home and abroad, and to turn his social capital to political ends both domestically and internationally. Employing means that varied from regular and cordial letters to diplomatic gifts and patronage for various offices, and eagerly seeking advice from friends and colleagues on most major decisions, Newcastle apparently expected that favours once rendered might someday be returned. Circumstances surrounding the diplomatic revolution of 1756 and internal changes in Britain's government over the same period, however, seriously threatened and partly undermined Newcastle's model of government through the investment and redistribution of his extensive social capital.

Like his friend Holderness, whom he had helped raise to a position of prominence after 1748, Newcastle had an acute sense of favours rendered and favours expected. Holderness, as one of the principal secretaries of state from 1751 to 1761, mostly applied this reasoning and a keen intuition to British diplomacy in Europe, even though he rarely appears to have

concerned himself with either domestic matters or the colonies. Newcastle, by contrast, involved himself in every sphere of government, from law to finance,⁵¹ from Pennsylvania to Prussia, and from managing Parliament to winning favours from the crown. With the diverse array of powers that he accrued by involving himself so deeply in government by the mid-1750s, Newcastle touched almost every aspect of British political life. In the process, however, he acquired both rivals for power and immense responsibilities that more than once nearly crushed him.

Given his long-running quest for power and political influence, Newcastle had already established a great many friendships, commitments, and rivalries over 30 years in government before the Diplomatic Revolution. Ironically, for the man who would become Britain's first lord of the Treasury in 1754, Newcastle had a long history as a "Duke without money," calling in both friends and financiers to help control his extraordinary personal spending habits.⁵² Maintaining his political freedom by refusing to tie his interests to particular members of the royal household, Newcastle also courted rivalries with the faction of the Duke of Cumberland, George II's youngest son, and with Leicester House, the party associated with the widow of Frederick, Prince of Wales. During his rise to prominence under Walpole, he built a circle of capable Whig allies later known as the "Old Corps," but the jealous guarding of his political prerogatives also sowed the seeds for increasingly invidious rivalries that spilt from Parliament into the press.⁵³

Despite his considerable political capital, then, Newcastle already had trouble brewing on the horizon—domestically, as well as in the colonies—when his brother, Henry, suddenly died on 6 March 1754. A capable and loyal minister as well as cherished kin, Henry Pelham was first lord of the Treasury, chancellor of the Exchequer, and the ministry's principal speaker in the House of Commons at the time of his death. Although with his own promotion to the Treasury virtually assured, the grieving Newcastle had to wait six weeks for parliamentary elections in April before he could begin the tedious process of rebuilding his ministry and supplying his brother's place.

In the wake of Pelham's death, several candidates stood out for promotion to high office. Henry Fox, a leading personality in Cumberland's faction, seemed destined for the secretary of state's office that Newcastle had vacated in his move to the Treasury, but the latter hoped to minimise the influence of the King's favourite son, and George II opposed Pitt's rise to power. Both men ultimately found positions in the reconstituted ministry—Fox as secretary at War and Pitt as paymaster of the Forces. But Newcastle and the King ultimately settled on Thomas Robinson as a compromise candidate for secretary of state for the South. Holderness moved to the Northern Department, and Henry Legge ultimately became chancellor of the Exchequer by August. Nobody was truly happy with the ministerial arrangements, and Pitt and Fox opened an ill-fated opposition by autumn.⁵⁴

Meanwhile, Washington's bungled embassy to Fort le Boeuf undermined the ministry's intentions for negotiating colonial disputes in Europe. To make matters worse, the expedition of Governor-General Ange Menneville, Marquis Duquesne, into the Pennsylvania backcountry scuttled all hope of a resolution without arms by April 1754.⁵⁵ The situation worsened by summer with Washington's vexed victory at Jumonville's Glen on 28 May and his embarrassing surrender at Fort Necessity a mere five weeks later.⁵⁶

Diplomacy in Europe might have retrieved the situation in North America, but two more deaths marred what good feelings may have remained between London and Versailles. For the moment, both metropolitan powers retained more or less good relations, an open channel of communication, and the wherewithal to rein in bellicose colonial officials. This state of affairs effectively ended on 24 July 1754—about a month before the news of Jumonville's Glen and Fort Necessity completed its transatlantic voyage—with the death of François Dominique, Marquis de Barberie de St. Contest, the pacifist French foreign minister. Antoine-Louis Rouillé, the former minister for the Marine, whose department oversaw colonial affairs, succeeded him. Rouillé's able and ambitious subordinate, the Abbé de la Ville, also moved into the ministry of foreign affairs and took the opportunity to defend in Europe the aggressive measures that he had sanctioned in North America.⁵⁷ Adding insult to injury was the death by year's end of William Anne van Keppel, Second Earl of Albemarle—Britain's diplomat at Versailles—and the absence of France's diplomat in London, Charles-Pierre Gaston François de Lévis, Duc de Mirepoix, from July 1754 to January 1755.⁵⁸ With Anglo-French diplomacy largely left in the hands of subordinates, mutual suspicions grew accordingly, and proclamations of good intentions matched poorly with on-going military preparations.

Some of the military preparations, as well—or at least, the announcements thereof—also lay outside Newcastle's control. In an effort to tip the uneasy cabinet balance effected over the summer, Cumberland and Fox advertised British military preparations in the *London Gazette*. In so doing, they annoyed Newcastle, but for diplomatic more than domestic reasons. The advertisement undermined whatever confidence Newcastle had hoped to build with his French counterparts by keeping the preparations secret, and it gave Kaunitz an early hint that Britain might soon need to renegotiate its alliances on the continent.⁵⁹ By November, Newcastle could do little more than write to Albemarle, "For God's sake, prevent a quarrel, if you can," whilst Austrian leaders began to withdraw their forces from the Low Countries.⁶⁰ The simultaneous degradation of both Anglo-French and Anglo-Austrian relations in this case appears to be more than mere coincidence, and though Newcastle evidently appreciated the situation at hand, events beyond his control limited what ability he might have had to prevent or mitigate the damage.

As the French prepared their response to what would become Braddock's expedition, the Austrian position stiffened. By March 1755, Newcastle could rely on his Austrian friends to give him intelligence of French preparations by sea, but neither he, nor Holderness as Northern Secretary, nor the British envoy, Robert Keith, could coax a declaration from Vienna that it intended to stand firm on land.⁶¹ They met instead with a long-anticipated proposal to solidify British ties with Russia; only *then* were Kaunitz and Maria Theresa prepared to carry out the terms of the Barrier Alliance.⁶² By April, Newcastle and his colleagues embraced the Austrian proposals, preparing a new envoy, Sir Charles Hanbury Williams, to replace the sickly yet experienced Guy Dickens, whose last despatch offered a preview of the next six months:

the true reason of the immoderate delays, I have met with, in the depending negotiation, since my conference of the 24th January (old stile), with the two chancellors, is: that they are desirous here, to see, before they take any resolutions, if the disputes between England & France, about the affairs of America, will not come to a rupture, that this court may sell their assistance the dearer to His Majesty; knowing these people here as I do, I am not at all surprised at these proceedings... I am much less in pain, about the success of the measures pursuing here, than I am about the dependence, which may be had on them, when they are brought to perfection, for sooner, or later, they will accept His Majesty's offers, rather than bear the whole expence, of the great body of troops, which they cannot avoid keeping on their frontiers.⁶³

Newcastle, who had observed and conducted negotiations with Russia as Northern Secretary in 1746–1748, 1750, and 1753, could not have been ignorant about the challenges facing Williams, but it was certainly no good to either man that the latter would have to confront the intrigues and intricacies of St. Petersburg without Dickens' help. British ministers, Newcastle amongst them, noted the strength of Russia's negotiating position, as well as the ticking of the clock toward open war with their alliances still insecure.⁶⁴ All they could do for the moment with any surety was to act by sea, not in hopes of expanding the colonial war, but in hopes of containing it.⁶⁵

By early July, both initiatives had evidently failed. Mobilisation in the colonies expanded the scope for operations in North America far beyond what Newcastle had first envisioned. Rather than banking on the success of one campaign in the Pennsylvania backcountry, British prestige now depended on four separate expeditions on land and yet another at sea. With Governor Charles Lawrence and Colonel Robert Monckton achieving quick success in Acadia,⁶⁶ Braddock's expedition suffered catastrophic failure, and Boscawen took only two French ships.⁶⁷ Moreover, although British ministers would not know its effects for another year, Austrian policy changed on 27 June, abandoning hopes for the Russian subsidy treaty and a renewed Barrier Alliance before Williams had much of a chance to negotiate.⁶⁸

By mid-July, growing concerns about America and Europe manifested themselves in domestic politics. Largely symbolic, Legge's refusal to sign levy warrants for a subsidy treaty with Hesse-Cassel sparked more visible and widespread opposition to Newcastle's ministry.⁶⁹ Again, Newcastle favoured Pitt coming into office, and again Pitt's rhetoric and opposition from the king stifled Newcastle's hopes.⁷⁰ By September, Fox replaced Robinson as southern secretary in a ministry that clearly constituted Newcastle's last choice; although hoping it would be stable, he was not particularly confident.⁷¹ Whilst British domestic politics ran its course, the Austrian envoy, Michael Stahremberg, received orders to begin secret negotiations at Versailles.⁷²

As negotiations progressed throughout the autumn, Newcastle and his colleagues were probably mistaken in their assumption that Prussian neutrality would satisfy the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna. The merits of this new tie follow, here it is important to note again the degree to which emerging wars in America and Europe combined with domestic politics were forcing Newcastle into situations not of his choosing. As the colonial war approached European soil, British leaders including Newcastle used what initiative remained to them to solidify their position at sea and bring over Hessian and Hanoverian troops for the island kingdom's defence. The latter, in particular, played poorly with public opinion, and adverse press reports critical of the German mercenaries happened roughly to coincide with the Dutch declaration of neutrality in March 1756.⁷³ Likewise, it was Newcastle's ministry more than officials in the Mediterranean, who received the blame when Admiral John Byng came within a hair's breadth, but no closer, of achieving a major strategic coup.⁷⁴

Harassed by the opposition and their allies in the press, Newcastle watched helplessly as one initiative after another came to nought in spring and summer 1756. Whilst perhaps faulting Newcastle and his allies for not sending enough ships to the Mediterranean, or for miscalculating the short-term effects of the Convention of Westminster, it would have been difficult for Newcastle to predict the firestorm of opinion that rose against him in the wake of Byng's failure and the report of the first Austro-French Treaty of Versailles.⁷⁵ The latter news came, as well, on the heels of George, Prince of Wales attaining his majority and new positions of power opening up not only for Newcastle's friends, but also for his enemies.⁷⁶ All of this, added to Britain's defeat at Oswego, New York colony,⁷⁷ and a fast-approaching European war was too much for Newcastle's fellow ministers, including Fox, who resigned at a crucial moment in hopes of securing his own political gains.⁷⁸

Newcastle's only respite came in November 1756 when he left ministerial office for the first time since 1723.⁷⁹ For eight months, his party remained split, with several friends such as Holderness remaining in high office during the Pitt-Devonshire ministry and the interministerium from April

to June 1757.⁸⁰ The exodus from office of Newcastle's friends after Holderness's resignation on 9 June 1757 stood as proof of his extensive social capital;⁸¹ and it was clear even before the cascade of resignations that no ministry would long stand with Newcastle in opposition.

The new Pitt-Newcastle ministry that kissed hands at the end of June 1757 represents the true end of the Diplomatic Revolution, alongside more comprehensive Austro-French arrangements under the second Treaty of Versailles in May. Only from this point forward is it possible to perceive the full scope of the Seven Years War taking shape, with a loosely connected Britain and Prussia, on one side, and an extensive coalition between Austria, France, Russia, and their collected allies on the other. Alongside Frederick and Pitt, it was Newcastle's war to win, and his political survival through the Diplomatic Revolution would ultimately inform a substantial part of the Anglo-Prussian alliance's overall strategy.

Despite a hostile press and ministerial intrigues at home, despite flagging military and diplomatic fortunes abroad, and despite severe shortcomings and ill-timed deaths amongst his friends and allies in both theatres, Newcastle not only weathered the diplomatic revolution and its fallout in British politics but, by the end of 1757, he emerged triumphant. By 1759, many of the measures he had supported during his ministry's darkest hours appeared to have been vindicated, though the ageing statesman found himself again at a loss when a second diplomatic revolution began at the end of 1760. Perhaps by accident and luck, and seconded by well-chosen political allies in the right places at the right time, his essential appreciation of strategic realities in 1754 and 1755 informed eventual and widespread military success against the eighteenth century's most formidable chain of alliances. However, his fading political instincts and increasingly out-dated social networks adapted only poorly to the personnel and policies of a new reign in 1760, and to radical changes in the Euro-Atlantic international system by 1762.

For any minister in Newcastle's position by the end of 1754, the combined weight of a brother's death, the loss of two major allies on French soil, the juggling of cabinet ministers, and the emerging conflict in North America would have posed a major challenge. Burdened by grief in both personal and political capacities, Newcastle responded as best he could to emerging international tensions both at home and on either side of the Atlantic. If he failed to stem the growing influence of the Fox-Cumberland faction at home, he at least kept pace with it. And if Britain under his aegis no longer maintained a controlling influence over the loyalties of Austria and the United Provinces,⁸² the Court of Westminster neither risked nor suffered the kind of isolation that threatened their counterparts in Vienna, Berlin, and especially Versailles. Never radiating Pitt's confidence and daring, Newcastle nonetheless manipulated the tools of state with skill and poise, leaving Britain by the beginning of 1756 in a good position to wage war against France with financial,

diplomatic, and military advantage. The despatch of Braddock, the orders given to Boscawen, the prompt—if inadequate—build-up of naval and land forces, and Admiral Edward Hawke's strikes against the French merchant marine, all were sound strategic measures. Even steps taken by Newcastle's ministry for the defence of Minorca found basis on the best information available at the time just as they were concerted in full accordance with expert recommendations.

At home, Newcastle was amongst the first to perceive the potential for a ministerial tie with Pitt. Primarily concerned with the rising influence of Fox and Cumberland, Newcastle and his allies worked to limit their formal powers whilst remaining on cordial terms. Meanwhile, the duke endeavoured to persuade George II to overlook his aversion to Pitt and allow the latter a position of greater influence.⁸³ Thomas Robinson's appointment as southern secretary in April 1754 reflected not only the considerations in his favour, but also Newcastle's attempt to find someone palatable to Pitt.⁸⁴ Newcastle consistently respected his later partner's oratorical skill and standing in the press and built domestic alliances that appeared to have Pitt, as well as Fox's faction, consistently in mind. Thus, in late summer 1755, despite Pitt's virulent opposition in the Commons and his alliances with Fox, the Tories, and Leicester House, Newcastle successfully lobbied the king to allow his presence in the cabinet and opened negotiations accordingly. Much more than anything said against Newcastle, it was Pitt's intransigence and heavy-handedness in negotiations that scuttled a possible partnership at the end of 1755 and forced Newcastle to accept the alliance with Fox.

Removed from the ministry altogether by Fox's machinations at the end of 1756, Newcastle never lost hope in the prospect of alliance with Pitt and a return to power, and he worked toward those ends during the latter's minority ministry early in 1757. By mid-June, there is room to suspect if not to contend with absolute certainty, that Newcastle worked behind the scenes to orchestrate both Holderness's resignation from the secretary of state's offices and the ensuing exodus of his allies from their political appointments over the next two days. With threats still looming for the formation of a minority Fox ministry, Pitt finally accepted what may safely be called Newcastle's compromise terms, and he finally entered a cabinet partnership on 29 June—more than three years after Newcastle's first proposals.⁸⁵

As in his dealings with Pitt and Fox, Newcastle strove as best he could to navigate a path between diplomacy and war with France. Despite Mirepoix's absence and the deaths of St. Contest and Albemarle, Newcastle persisted in trying to negotiate with his French counterparts into early 1755, even after the ill-advised advertisement in the *London Gazette*. Once it became clear that hostilities with France were inevitable and that the tie with Austria was on the wane, Newcastle figured amongst the first to advise alternative

measures. By April 1755, he took a leading role in getting Boscawen and Holbourne to sea, whilst seizing on Austrian proposals for a Russian alliance as the cheapest and surest way of containing France on the continent. By August, he consolidated these initiatives by sending Hawke to sea without a declaration of war and using the on-going negotiations with Elizabeth as a starting point for closing with Prussia. The measure of his success is not the capture of the French warships, *Alcide* and *Lys*, nor the failed Russian ratification of the Convention of St. Petersburg, but rather the conclusion of the Convention of Westminster and the cautious French approach to the Minorca expedition in 1756.

Newcastle's flexibility in the realm of foreign policy is particularly of note, not only in his willingness to work with Prussia, but also in the arrangements surrounding it. Although he may have erred in thinking that Frederick's declaration of neutrality would satisfy Vienna and St. Petersburg, and that Austria would then aid British aims in the west,⁸⁶ it was not his only plan. Using the Hessian treaty, Newcastle had already decided as a matter of official policy to limit British involvement on the continent to the defence of the king's German lands only.⁸⁷ He was thus more prepared than perhaps he himself anticipated when Austrian and Russian leaders made their approach to France, and when the Dutch declared neutrality. Growing ties with Prussia and the Duchy of Brunswick were an added bonus rather than a central aspect of Newcastle's plans.

His flexibility in other respects, too, has come down in many cases as indecision or weakness, for example in his long despatch to Philip Yorke, the First Earl of Hardwicke, the lord chancellor, regarding the legality of Hawke's voyage in summer 1755.⁸⁸ Unable to determine the best course of action, Newcastle consulted his friends and his superior—the king—as to his next course of action. Residing far below the stature of an absolute politician, Newcastle simply could not dictate policy in the same way as Frederick the Great or even Kaunitz. As Newcastle himself noted to a friend in 1756, "Every man who pretends to be a minister in this country, is a *fool*, if he acts a day without the House of Commons; and a greater fool, if he depends upon any, of whom he cannot be sure."⁸⁹ Granted the appropriate powers to act and confident of support in Parliament, Newcastle acted swiftly and decisively on the issue of Hawke's voyage, casting aside considerations of prevailing maritime law and international custom.⁹⁰ Within a year, Newcastle's appreciation for the value of maritime trade informed yet another decision of dubious legality—the "Rule of the War" of 1756 penned by Hardwicke, which declared that neutrals could not benefit from trade privileges extended by a belligerent Power during a time of war.⁹¹

Thus, Newcastle could appear as vacillating, but it was at least as much a reflection of his circumstances as of his personality. The contrast with Pitt, whilst palpable, also explains his greater favour with the king. Conversely,

there is little denying Pitt's greater prestige amongst the rancorous British press, which may go far in explaining Newcastle's long-running desire to ally with him. During the era of the Pitt-Newcastle ministry, the two ministers achieved a balance of power and responsibility unseen since the days of Henry Pelham. Newcastle curried what favour he could from the king; Pitt managed press and Parliament. Both partook in cabinet debates, and their relationship in office was generally cordial so long as George II lived.⁹² This combination, as Newcastle appears to have foreseen at least in some measure, succeeded where the combinations with Fox and Robinson had failed.

Newcastle's sense of balance also applied to his work with finances. Notoriously poor with his personal accounts,⁹³ Newcastle performed well as first lord of the Treasury, supporting annual expenditures as high as £20,000,000 at the height of the Seven Years War.⁹⁴ He did so, however, without the major tax hikes that occurred in states such as France and Prussia and borrowed large sums of money at some of the lowest interest rates in Europe.⁹⁵ Official corruption under Newcastle's watch remained relatively low and, although worries in this regard constantly plagued him,⁹⁶ he generally succeeded in passing votes of credit from Parliament and generating loan subscriptions amongst London merchants. In short, Newcastle's Treasury was generally a reliable one and profited from its reliability. The duke undoubtedly had sound financial advice from able subordinates such as his undersecretary, James West,⁹⁷ but more than economics kept his ministry afloat. When Newcastle considered retirement from office in 1760, the moneyed interest in London persuaded him to stay—in part for reasons of economic stability, but perhaps, in part, too, because he was so well known amongst them and certainly much more so than his eventual successor, the Third Earl of Bute.⁹⁸

In several respects, then, Newcastle appealed to sentiments of popularity as much as of fiscal sense in his running of the Treasury. By keeping both taxes and corruption low, his financial schemes left the British public without the same burdens as their counterparts in France, and his social contacts amongst the moneyed interests in London probably encouraged them to offer loans more readily than they might otherwise have done. In short, Newcastle's quip about loyalty in Parliament might also apply to his own behaviour with British financiers.⁹⁹ The impression that he and his Treasury could be relied upon encouraged London merchants to offer large sums of money at low rates of interest; Britain's war effort thus became that much easier—if not necessarily easy—to bear, and the large investments from London merchants accordingly contributed to Britain's ultimate strategic and diplomatic success.

To end at the beginning, Newcastle was also amongst the first to appreciate the value of the American colonies, to sympathise with their strategic situation and integrate them into a broader international map that spanned

the Atlantic. Indeed, in summer and autumn 1755, he seems to have been nearly by himself in this respect. Newcastle alone appeared to understand the full weight of Fox's advertisement in the *London Gazette* at the end of 1754, and he figured amongst the first to propose regular troops—the first in half a century—for service in North America.¹⁰⁰ Even when alliances changed, the breadth of Newcastle's strategic vision remained, and he kept a commitment in principle to both continental and maritime theatres. Given the breadth of his social and financial connexions, he may have been alone amongst ministers in power to appreciate the value of the Canada trade for France.¹⁰¹ Whether this played a part in his strategic reckonings is unclear. But even if Newcastle were totally blind to the structure of French finance, it is certain that his appreciation of the whole Atlantic world, and the policies that he grounded in that appreciation, helped to over-stretch French resources and make the Seven Years War a more successful enterprise for Britain than it might otherwise have been.

In sum, the worries that pundits and historians have observed in Newcastle had a genuine basis in reality and were not merely a personal quirk. Burdened by personal, social, and financial pressures, obligations to king and Parliament, and the full gamut of military, maritime, economic, and colonial issues, the veteran minister had more on his plate than perhaps any other single leader during the course of the Diplomatic Revolution leading into the Seven Years War. He was not without his share of faults, and he undoubtedly committed errors of judgement in the strategic and international realms as much as in domestic politics and his personal life. Nonetheless, he operated about as well as one might have hoped in a political system that demanded a large array of social and financial debts and an international system that operated as a structured anarchy in the best of times. He was a global thinker in an era when most strategic debates still pitted land against sea and the colonies against Europe.¹⁰²

From the above assessment, it may seem that London was at the centre of international politics during the Diplomatic Revolution and the ensuing Seven Years War. Certainly, the success of British arms and their central place in deciding the war contributes to that appearance. However, Kaunitz and Maria Theresa made decisions on their own, Madame Pompadour and her allies directed their own efforts from Versailles, Frederick decided the fate of his kingdom in the fields of East Central Europe, and Elizabeth continued to assess her empire's military and diplomatic prospects surrounded by her advisors in St. Petersburg.

Each leader, in every capital, brought a unique perspective to the shape and progress of the war, and each sought in their own way to influence the domestic, strategic, and international forces that bore upon the progress of their arms. Newcastle was therefore far from alone in trying to concert a meaningful strategy for winning the war, nor did his fellow ministers and

members of Parliament in London operate in isolation. What they achieved under Newcastle's lead, however, although they may not have perceived its scope at the time, was to concert a set of strategies and policies that far surpassed in their sophistication and promises for success anything their counterparts conceived on the European continent—for domestic pundits and financial supporters as well as diplomats and troops. Thus, whilst arguments may yet appear that Austria and Russia fared well during the Seven Years War alongside Frederick's Prussia, Newcastle's Britain—until 1762—achieved even greater success, so much, in fact, that good fortune embarrassed the man and his fellow ministers.

Newcastle's engagement with every aspect of British political life allowed both his powers and his responsibilities to exceed those of any continental counterpart. Even as Frederick risked life and limb in the field, he delegated to subordinates the delicate tasks of legal reform and openly professed his ignorance about the value of transoceanic colonies.¹⁰³ Kaunitz masterminded Austrian diplomacy and dabbled in matters of law and finance, yet the court of public opinion rarely tried him,¹⁰⁴ and Austria lacked a formal navy.¹⁰⁵ To compare Newcastle with Madame Pompadour is not to compare like with like. Yet, one can at least say that whilst Newcastle offered her pineapples and olive branches amid an escalating colonial crisis,¹⁰⁶ she played a leading role in destroying his foreign policy system; and as Newcastle elevated men of unquestioned ability, Pompadour apparently placed an even greater stress on personal loyalty.¹⁰⁷

In conclusion, Newcastle was a capable, talented, sensitive, and articulate minister, but who was nonetheless only human—with all the frailties of a man under constant and extreme stress added to longstanding insecurities. Alternately panicked and incited to action by deteriorating circumstances beyond his control, he placed his chief reliance in thousands of pounds sterling and dozens of years invested in extensive social capital. Untimely desertions, demotions, and deaths amongst his allies combined to hinder his policies in the mid-1750s, although his remaining friends, uncanny strategic foresight, and keen political savvy saw him through to the apex of his political career. By the early 1760s, generational change and the very success of Newcastle's strategies and cabinet policies produced circumstances over which he could no longer claim mastery. In a political system heavily reliant on social connexions, patronage, and diplomatic niceties, Newcastle performed about as well as any single minister could hope. In an extremely dynamic international environment, contending with questionable allies, implacable enemies, and the vicissitudes of military fortune, he conceived, negotiated, and executed policies that raised millions of pounds sterling and sent British forces around the globe on an unprecedented scale. These policies, moreover, contributed powerfully to defining Britain's national and international identity. The success he enjoyed in all of these measures, despite their fragility and uncertainty at the best of times, has long been

overshadowed by the opposition and harassment that he met in proposing them, and by his indecisiveness and fearful responses during a period of unceasing personal, domestic, and international turmoil. A leisurely read through the major documentary resources and much of the historiography reveals more than enough of the man's stresses and strains, foibles, and weaknesses. However, asking for much greater insight from him or any other British minister into the social, political, strategic, and financial realities of his day would have demanded a greatness that remains questionable even for his royal contemporary in Prussia.¹⁰⁸

Notes

1. During this period, Britain maintained a unique cabinet organisation with separate secretaries of state for northern and southern Europe. The former corresponded with British diplomats in the United Provinces, the various German states, Austria, Scandinavia, and Russia; the latter corresponded with British diplomats in Portugal, Spain, France, Switzerland, the various Italian states, and the Ottoman Empire. Holderness occupied the Southern Department until March 1754, and was subsequently secretary of state for the North until March 1761.
2. Circular letter to Colonial Governors, 28 August 1753, CO [Colonial Office Archives, TNA] 5/6 ff.92–3. For more general British concerns about the North American colonies in this period, see Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 August 1749, BL Add. MSS [BL] 32719, ff.69–74; Newcastle to Albemarle, 27 April to 8 May 1752, Ibid. 32835, ff.291–92; “Points for Consideration with My Lord Chancellor [Hardwicke],” 11 September 1754, Ibid. 32995, ff.318–325. A more detailed discussion appears in M. Schumann, “Mercantilism, Communications and the Early Prehistory of the Seven Years’ War, 1749–1754,” *Nuova Rivista Storica*, 89/1 (2005), 83–103.
3. Fredrick II, *History of the Seven Years War* (Potsdam, 1764; reprinted in English, 1789)
4. Richard Waddington, *Louis XV et le Renversement des Alliances* (Paris, 1896); idem., *Guerre de Sept Ans*, 5 volumes (Paris, 1896–1914). Cf. J. Entick, *General History of the Late War* (London, 1764); A. Schafer, *Siebenjährigen Krieg*, 2 volumes (Berlin, 1879).
5. A good summary and critique of this historiography appears in J. Black, “Essay and Reflection: On the ‘Old System’ and the ‘Diplomatic Revolution’ of the Eighteenth Century,” *International History Review*, 12/2 (1990), 301–23.
6. Lothar Schilling, *Kaunitz und das Renversement des Alliances* (Wien, 1989); René Hanke, *Brühl und Das Renversement des Alliances* (Münster, 2006)
7. Herbert Kaplan, *Russia and the Outbreak of the Seven Years War* (Berkeley, CA, 1968). D.B. Horn, “The Duke of Newcastle and the Origins of the Diplomatic Revolution,” in J.H. Elliott and H.G. Koenigsberger, eds., *The Diversity of History: Essays in Honour of Sir Herbert Butterfield* (London, 1970), 245–68. The most prominent attempt to rehabilitate Newcastle appears in R. Browning, *The Duke of Newcastle* (New Haven, CT, 1975). Horn’s basic ideas received re-enforcement, for example, from T.R. Clayton, “The Duke of Newcastle, the Earl of Halifax, and the American Origins of the Seven Years War,” *Historical Journal*, 24/3 (1981), 571–603.
8. To some extent, Browning, *Newcastle* covered most of these spheres of activity. Other works consider them separately, none juxtaposes them with the Diplomatic Revolution. Meanwhile, Newcastle’s relations with other, particularly foreign, aristocrats remains seldom remarked. An exception is a virtually unknown thesis: E. Roterberg, “Der Reichs

- Freiherr DoDo Heinrich zu inn und Knyphausen als Gesanter Friedrichs des Grossen am Englischen Hofe, 1758–1763” (Universität Greifswald, 1924).
9. Cf. Hanke, *Brühl*, passim.
 10. For *longue durée* and system approaches to the Diplomatic Revolution, its background, and consequences, cf. M. Braubach, *Versailles und Wien von Ludwig XIV bis Kaunitz* (Bonn, 1952); H. Klueting, *Die Lehre von der Macht der Staaten: das Aussenpolitische Macht problem in der politischen Wissenschaft und in der praktischen Politik im 18 Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1986); K.W. Schweizer, “The Seven Years War: A System Perspective,” in J. Black, ed., *The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe* (Edinburgh, 1987); P.W. Schroeder, *the Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford, 1994); E. Buddruss, *die französische Deutschlandspolitik, 1756–1789* (Mainz, 1995), 14–39; H. Duchhardt and F. Knipping, *Handbuch der Geschichte der Internationalen Beziehungen: Balance of Power und Pentarchie, 1700–1785* (Paderborn, 1997). A more brief, systemic appreciation of Kaunitz, in particular, appears in C. Ingrao, *the Habsburg Monarchy, 1618–1815* (Cambridge, 1994), 172–74.
 11. For a good critique of systemic approaches in general, see Black, “Essay and Reflection.” On the Diplomatic Revolution in particular, see R.N. Middleton, “French Policy and Prussia after the Peace of Aix la Chapelle, 1749–1753: A Study of the Prehistory of the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1968); R. Browning, “The Duke of Newcastle and the Imperial Election Plan, 1749–1754,” *Journal of British Studies*, 7/1 (1967), 28–47; idem., “The British Orientation of Austrian Foreign Policy, 1749–1754,” *Central European History*, 1/4(1968), 299–323; W.J. McGill, “Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz and the Congress of Aix la Chapelle, 1748,” *Duquesne Review*, 14 (1969), 184–213; idem., “The Roots of Policy: Kaunitz in Vienna and Versailles, 1749–1753,” *Journal of Modern History*, 43/2 (1971), 228–44; Horn, “Diplomatic Revolution”; J.C. Batzel, “Austria and the First Three Treaties of Versailles” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Brown University, 1974).
 12. K.W. Schweizer, *War, Politics and Diplomacy: The Anglo–Prussian Alliance, 1756–1763* (Lanham, MD, 2001), 171–72; C. Leonard, *Reform and Regicide: The Reign of Peter III of Prussia* (Bloomington, IN, 1993), Chapter 5.
 13. See M. Schumann and K.W. Schweizer, *The Seven Years War: A Transatlantic History* (London, 2008), Chapter VI.
 14. For a political cartoon to this end, “The Ballance turn’d: or the Russian Cat-arse-trophy, ” 9 October 1758, reprinted in F.G. Stevens, *Catalogue of Personal and Political Satires: Preserved in the Department of Prints and Drawings in the British Museum*, Volume 3, Part 2 (London, 1978), 1193. See also Newcastle to Hardwicke, 12 June 1756, BL Add. MSS 35415, ff. 188–89; Versailles Agent to Cressener [regarding French War Minister Marshal Belle Isle], 7 May 1758, Versailles Agent to Holdernes, 12 May 1758, both in BL Add. MSS 32879, ff.438–440.
 15. Maybe not have used these precise words to describe his political algebra, Kaunitz’s idea is clear in his *Denkschrift* of 25 March 1749. See R. Pommerin and L. Schilling, eds., “Denkschrift des Grafen Kaunitz zur mächtropolitischen Konstellation nach dem Aachener Frieden von 1748,” in J. Kunisch, ed., *Expansion und Gleichgewicht: Studien zur europäischen Mächtropolitik des ancien régime* (Berlin, 1986), 165–239. Original in HHStA Kart 62. ff 158–78.
 16. C. Ingrao, “Habsburg Strategy and Geopolitics during the 18th Century,” in G. Rothberg et. al., eds., *East Central European Society and War in the pre-Revolutionary Eighteenth Century* (Boulder, CO, 1982), 63–64; J. Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War,” *World Politics*, 36/1 (1983), 76–89. See also Browning, *Newcastle*, 234.

17. Despite Frederick's tarnished reputation in France by 1756, the wily Belle Isle was willing to work within the constraints of Prussian diplomacy and much preferred the *status quo* to a revolution in French foreign policy. Last considered at length by Waddington in 1896, the internal deliberations of the French cabinet deserve and require a modern treatment in a separate article if not a book. The best modern treatment is Middleton, "French Policy and Prussia."
18. Cf. Franz A.J. Szabo, *Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism, 1753–1780* (Cambridge, NY, 1994); Dennis Showalter, *The Wars of Frederick the Great* (London, NY, 1996).
19. For example, M. Cooper, *the State Farce: a Lyrick, inscribed to the Duke of Newcastle* (London, 1756); H. Walpole, *Memoirs of the Reign of King George III*, 2 volumes (London, 1845); Lord Hervey, *Some Materials towards Memoirs of the Reign of King George II*, 3 volumes (London, 1931); J. Carswell and L.A. Dralle, eds. *The Political Journal of George Bubb Dodington* (Oxford, 1965), 296–98, 302, 314. See also the regular harangues of Newcastle and the Old Corps Whigs in the *Test, Contest, and Monitor* periodicals.
20. Browning, *Newcastle*, xii, 180. See also L. Krieger, *Kings and Philosophers, 1689–1789* (NY, 1970), 264, and relevant listings in P.J. Kulisheck, *The Duke of Newcastle, 1693–1768: A Bibliography* (Westport, CT, 1997).
21. J. Black, "Thomas Pelham Holles—Duke of Newcastle," in R. Eccleshall and G. Walker, *Biographical Dictionary of British Prime Ministers* (London, 1998) 28–34; E.J.S. Fraser, "The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct of the Seven Years War" (D.Phil. Dissertation, Oxford, 1976); M. Peters, *Pitt and Popularity* (Oxford, 1980); R. Middleton, *The Bells of Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct of the Seven Years War, 1757–1762* (London, 1985). See also R. Browning, "The Duke of Newcastle and the Financing of the Seven Years War," *Journal of Economic History*, 31/2 (1971), 344–77; J. Black, *Pitt the Elder* (Stroud, 1999); D. Baugh, *The Global Seven Years War* (NY, 2008).
22. Newcastle's rigid fixation on the past, particularly on the diplomatic legacy of King William III, features pre-eminently in H.M. Scott, "The True Principles of the Revolution, the Duke of Newcastle and the Idea of the Old System," in J. Black, ed., *Knights-Errent and True Englishmen: British Foreign Policy, 1660–1800* (Edinburgh, 1988), 55–91; J. Black, "The British Attempt to Preserve the Peace in Europe, 1748–1755," *Zwischenstaatliche Friedenswahrung in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit*, Band 1 (Wien, 1991), 230, 241. See also Horn, "Diplomatic Revolution"; K.W. Schweizer, *England, Prussia and the Seven Years War* (Lewiston, NY, 1989), 121–64.
23. P. Higonnet, "The Origins of the Seven Years War," *Journal of Modern History*, 40/1, 57–90; J.C.D. Clark, *Dynamics of Change: The Crisis of the 1750s and English Party Systems* (Cambridge, 1982); Clayton, "American Origins." More generally, see Browning, *Newcastle*, 96, 196–260.
24. Admittedly far from complete, a useful summary of Frederick's writings during this period may be found in Frederick II [J.D.E. Preuss et al., eds.], *Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen* [hereafter *Politische Correspondenz*], 46 volumes (Berlin, 1879–1939), especially volumes 10–22. See also relevant sections of Franz A.J. Szabo, *The Seven Years War in Europe* (NY, 2007). Despite a large historiography in both English and German, there is yet no full treatment of Frederick's handling of the burdens of leadership.
25. For more details on Frederick's military and civilian subordinates, see C. Duffy, *The Army of Frederick the Great* (London, 1974); H. Johnson, *Frederick the Great and His Officials* (London, 1975).

26. Maria Theresa also held the titles of Holy Roman Empress—as wife of Emperor Francis I—Queen of Bohemia, Queen of Hungary, and Duchess of Tuscany. On her attitude toward Kaunitz, cf. François Joachim de Bernis [K.P. Wormeley, translator], *Memoirs and Letters of Cardinal François de Bernis*, Volume II (Boston, MA, 1901), 36.
27. Between the Newcastle and Hardwicke papers in the British Library, one discovers not only professional correspondence with other ministers such as Pitt, but also the very friendly terms on which Newcastle operated with Lord Chancellor Hardwicke and his son, Joseph Yorke, Britain's envoy to the United Provinces of the Netherlands.
28. The difficulties characterising French diplomacy in this period are aptly covered in Middleton, "French Policy and Prussia"; Batzel, "Treaties of Versailles." See also H.M. Scott. *The Emergence of the Eastern Powers, 1756–1775* (Cambridge, 2001), Chapter I.
29. See Schroeder, *European Politics*, Chapter 1; Clark, *Dynamics of Change*.
30. Pommerin and Schilling, "Grafen Kaunitz."
31. Cf. especially Middleton, "French Policy and Prussia."
32. An intriguing commentary on this middle stage appears in Browning, "British Orientation." See also Schilling, *Kaunitz*, 68ff. Bartenstein's proposal adopted by Kaunitz, HHStA Vort. Kart 61, IV, ff 90–105; ff 158–78.
33. This had already occurred for Maria Theresa in 1740–1741, and Frederick's attitudes after 1748 reveal constant alarm and suspicion, rather than the cunning for which he built a reputation during the earlier Silesian Wars. See *Politische Correspondenz*, Volumes I–XII passim (Berlin, 1879–1884).
34. With the exception of the Republic of Genoa and the kingdoms of Sardinia and Naples—the latter maintained a significant relationship with the Spanish crown—these were the major participants in the War of the Austrian Succession. By their distance from Protestant Europe and particularly Britain, the Italian states contended with a different set of international pressures and could hope for little better than neutrality in the event of an Austro–French alliance.
35. If they had not been widely acknowledged in the past, Anglo–French colonial disputes became a matter of public knowledge—and public record—across Europe through Articles IV and IX of the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle. Commissarial negotiations under the latter article, concerning the frontiers of Acadia—or Nova Scotia, as the British called it—appear in Mildmay MSS [WLCL] Volume II, *passim*. The negotiations ended without resolution in 1755.
36. J. Parmenter and M. Power Robison, "The Perils and Possibilities of Wartime Neutrality on the Edges of Empire: Iroquois and Acadians between the French and British in North America, 1744–1760," *Diplomatic History*, 31/2 (2007), 167–206.
37. For more detail on this section, cf. Clayton, "American Origins"; Schumann, "Early Prehistory."
38. Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, 16 June 1753, BL Add. MSS 32732/2, ff. 452–53; Halifax Memorial, 15 August 1753, BL Add. MSS 33029, ff. 96–100; minute, 21 August 1753, BL Add. MSS 32995, ff. 27–28.
39. Circular order to Colonial Governors, 28 August 1753, CO 5/6, ff. 92–93. Colonial newspapers subsequently printed these orders and eventually led to the Albany Congress of 19 June–10 July 1754. See, for instance, letter from Annapolis, 5 November 1753, *Maryland Gazette*, 445(15 November 1753), 2a–2b; Circular order to Colonial Governors from Board of Trade, 18 September 1753, J.R. Broadhead and E.B. O'Callahan, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York* (Albany, NY, 1858), Volume 6, 799–802; Wolcott to DeLancey, 27 November 1753, in S. Hart et al., eds., *Connecticut Historical Society Collections: Correspondence and Documents during Roger Wolcott's Governorship of the Colony of Connecticut, 1750–1754*, Volume 16

- (Hartford, CT, 1916), 402–03. I owe these references to Dr. Schumann. See also Hugh Valence Jones to Newcastle, 27 August 1753, Holdernessee to Newcastle, 27 August 1753, both BL Add. MSS 32732/2, f. 547 f. 556; A.G. Olson, “The British Government and Colonial Union, 1754,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 17/1 (1960), 22–34.
40. They were meant to intercept a squadron of 16 French ships of the line, many sailing *en flôte*, under Chef d’Escadre Emmanuel-August de Cahideuc, Comte du Bois de la Motte. See minutes, 18, 24 March 1755, BL Add. MSS 32996, ff. 50–51, 57; De Cosne to Robinson, 9 April 1755, SP [State Papers, TNA] 78/250, f. 167; minute, 22 April 1755, BL Add. MSS 32996, f. 89; B4 [Campaigns, Archives Nationales, Paris] Volume 68, ff. 3–10. Boscawen left Britain on 27 April and the French squadron under de la Motte on 3 May. See Captain James, HMS *Otter*, to Cleveland, 4 May 1755, BL Add. MSS 32854, ff. 383–84. For Holbourne’s sailing orders, see Robinson to Lords of the Admiralty, 8 May 1755, *Ibid.*, 415. Overall, see J. Dull, *The French Navy and the Seven Years War* (Lincoln, NE, 2005), 25–30.
 41. The Third Treaty of the Barrier appears in its entirety in C. Parry, *Consolidated Treaty Series*, Volume 29 (NY, 1986), 335–68. For diplomatic instructions regarding defensive preparations on the continent in 1755, see second minute, 17 April 1755, BL Add. MSS 32996, ff. 79–80. For an instructive dialogue on Anglo–Austrian relations at this crucial period, see SP 80/195–196, *passim*. Cf. “Narrative of the Negotiation, relative to the Barrier,” *Ibid.*, 102/116; A. Carter, *The Dutch Republic in Europe in the Seven Years War* (London, 1971), Chapter III.
 42. Memorials for the King, 16 April 1755, BL Add. MSS 32854, ff. 150–51; Newcastle to Yorke, 18 April 1755, *Ibid.*, ff. 169–71; Holdernessee to Newcastle, 19 April 1755, *Ibid.*, f. 182; minute, 17 April 1755, BL Eg. MSS 3426, ff. 51–59; Holdernessee to Keith, 31 May 1755, private, BL Eg. MSS 3455, ff. 36–37; Holdernessee to Keith, 20 May, 17 June 1755, both secret, SP 80/196.
 43. Newcastle to Holdernessee, 11 July 1755, BL Add. MSS 32857, f. 3; minute, 30 July 1755, *Ibid.*, ff. 491–93, 495–97; Holdernessee to Williams, 11 April 1755, AVPR, Snoshennia Angliei, 1795 OP. 35 d770. ff 157–65.
 44. Cf. Frederick II to Michell, 1 April 1755, *Politische Correspondenz*, XI, 102; Frederick II to Michell, 29 April 1755, GStAPK Rep. 96. 32H, f. 99; Holdernessee to Newcastle, 1 June 1755, BL Eg. MSS 3428, ff. 208–09; Holdernessee to Newcastle, 7 June 1755, BL Add. MSS 32855, f. 375; Holdernessee to Newcastle, 22 June 1755, *entre nous*, BL Add. MSS 32856, ff. 105–06; Newcastle to Münchhausen 25 July 1755, Münchhausen [Niedersächsisches Staatsarchiv, Hanover] I. nr. 22; Schweizer, *War, Politics and Diplomacy*, 11.
 45. Maria Theresa to Stahremberg, 21 August 1755, HHStA, Frankreich/Weisungen, 1754–1755, I–XII, fasc. 94. ff 38–39. See also Batzel, “Treaties of Versailles,” 82–90; Schilling, *Kaunitz*, 192–94.
 46. Despite much anticipation, French overtures to Prussia during the same period contained little more in substance than they had in years past. See Middleton, “French Policy and Prussia,” 321 *passim*. For the Convention of Westminster, see SP 108/421/421 Part 2; Shelburne MSS [WLCL] Volume 13, 81–85; D.C. Douglas and D.B. Horn, eds., *English Historical Documents*, Volume 10 (London, 1957), 934–36. Article I of the Convention declared neutrality between Britain and Prussia; Article II made vague provision for uniting their forces to defend Germany against an invading third party; Article III renewed previous treaties of alliance and guarantee between the two states dating to the 1740s; Article IV called for ratification of the treaty within a month. A separate article exempted the Austrian Netherlands from being part of Germany, placing it outside the scope of the treaty. A separate declaration resolved outstanding Anglo–

- Prussian disputes for the modest price of £20,000. For the talks leading to the treaty, see “Deduction of Continental Measures from 1755 to April 1758,” Bundle I, Weston MSS; Schweizer, *War, Politics and Diplomacy*, 10–18.
47. For details of the Minorca campaign, see B4, Volume 70; J.S. Corbett, *England in the Seven Years’ War; A Study in Combined Strategy* (London, 1907), 86–95. See also H.W. Richmond, ed., *Papers Relating to the Loss of Minorca in 1756* (London, 1913); D. Pope, *At Twelve Mr. Byng was Shot* (Philadelphia, PA, 1962), 136–60, 253–72.
 48. Cf. Middleton, “French Policy and Prussia,” 324; Newcastle to Yorke (very private), 11 June 1756, BL. Eg. MSS 3447, ff. 209–16.
 49. For a detailed account of the Pitt-Newcastle ministry’s creation, see Clark, *Dynamics of Change*, 373 ff. For its operation from 1757 to 1761, see Fraser, “Pitt-Newcastle Ministry”; Middleton, *Bells of Victory*.
 50. R.A. Kelch, *Newcastle: A Duke Without Money: Thomas Pelham-Holles, 1693–1768* (London, 1974).
 51. Some of his most prominent appointments landed in both these spheres. Philip Yorke, First Earl Hardwicke, and William Murray, First Baron Mansfield, had dual distinctions as both eminent jurists and Newcastle’s friends, whilst Newcastle’s brother, Henry—and eventually Newcastle himself—headed the board of the Treasury. Andrew Mitchell, the successful minister to Prussia, was also part of the Newcastle interest. Cf. K.W. Schweizer, “The Early Years of Sir Andrew Mitchell (1708–1771): A Biographical Addendum,” *Scottish Tradition*, XV (1989), 51–54.
 52. Kelch, *Duke Without Money*, 154 and *passim*.
 53. Cf., for instance, Browning, *Newcastle*, 25, 54, 59, 66–73.
 54. Clark, *Dynamics of Change*, 44–86.
 55. Extract of Dinwiddie to Holderness, 16 May 1754, BL Add. MSS 32850, f. 221; French summons for Trent’s fort to surrender, 15 April 1754, *Ibid.* ff. 223–25; J. Hadden, *Washington’s and Braddock’s Expeditions* (Washington, DC, 1910), 15–18. Some of Contrecoeur’s papers on this matter are in “New France” File [Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa].
 56. For accounts of Jumonville’s Glen, see Washington to Dinwiddie, 29 May 1754, in D. Bushnell, “Washington and the French, 1753–1754,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 24/3 (1916), 185. Jumonville’s orders in French and English in *Ibid.*, 186–88. On Fort Necessity, see *Virginia Gazette*, 1, 848 (19 July 1754), 2b–3a; Varin to Bigot, 24 July 1754, in S.K. Stevens and D.H. Kent, *Wilderness Chronicles of Northwestern Pennsylvania* (Harrisburg, PA, 1941), 80–82; Robinson to Albemarle, 2 September 1754, BL Add. MSS 32850, f. 191; [Intelligence from] Paris, 18 September 1754, *Ibid.*, f. 337; Mémoires et Documents (Amérique) [AECF] Volume 10, part I, ff. 114–25. See also Higonnet, “Origins,” 72–73; Clayton, “American Origins,” 585–87; Schumann, “Early Prehistory,” 98–99; G. Frégault, *Canada: The War of the Conquest* (Oxford, 1969), 68–72; F.W. Brecher, *Losing a Continent: France’s North American Policy, 1753–1763* (London, 1998), 50–55; F. Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1753–1766* (London, 2000), 5–7, 54–59, 62–65, 755–56.
 57. Albemarle to Robinson, 24 July, 14 August 1754, BL Add. MSS 33027, ff. 269, 271; Albemarle to Robinson, 24, 26, 30 July 1754, Shelburne MSS Volume 36, Nos. 12, 14, 15; Robinson to Albemarle, 1 August 1754, *Ibid.*, No. 18; J. Rogister, *Louis XV and the Parlement of Paris, 1737–1755* (Cambridge, 1995), 239n113. On St. Contest’s pacific policies, see Broadhead and O’Callahan, *Colonial History*, Volume 10, 242n1. On de la Ville’s entry into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Knyphausen to Frederick II, 24 February 1754, GStAPK Rep. 96.32F, ff. 74–76, reprinted in *Politische Correspondenz*,

- XI, 77–78; Albemarle to Robinson, 27 November 1754, BL Add. MSS 33027, ff. 283–84; de Cosne to Robinson, 8 January 1755, SP 78/250, f. 27; Dull, *French Navy*, 24.
58. Robinson to Albemarle, 18 July 1754, Shelburne MSS Volume 36, No. 10; Albemarle to Robinson, 11 December 1754, BL Add. MSS 33027, f. 286. See also J. Black, “Anglo–French Relations, 1740–1756,” *Francia*, 17/2 (1990), 71, 74.
 59. Newcastle to Albemarle, 10 October 1754, BL Add. MSS 32851, ff. 51–52; Albemarle to Robinson, 16 October 1754, BL Add. MSS 33027, f. 278. See also Newcastle to Hardwicke, 12 October 1754; Hardwicke to Newcastle, 13 October 1754, BL Add. MSS 32737, ff. 107–09; 147–48; Higonnet, “Origins,” 76; Clayton, “American Origins,” 592–93; Clark, *Dynamics of Change*, 99; S. Pargellis, ed., *Military Affairs in North America, 1748–1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle* (NY, 1969), xii.
 60. Newcastle to Albemarle, 7 November 1754, BL Add. MSS 32851, f. 162; Keith to Holderness, 21 November 1754, *Ibid.*, ff. 195–201, SP 80/194; Keith to Newcastle, 28 November 1754, BL Add. MSS 32851, f. 275.
 61. Keith to Holderness, 15 January, 4 March 1755, SP 80/195; cf. B.L. Add. MSS 32853, ff. 52–68.
 62. Keith to Holderness 4 March 1755, separate (see the public and secret letters of this date, as well), SP 80/195. See also Frederick II to Klinggräffen, 18 February 1755, *Politische Correspondenz*, XI, 59–60.
 63. Dickens to Holderness, 11/22 April 1755, SP 91/60. All spellings *sic*. Holderness to Williams, 11 April 1755 (very secret), *Ibid.*; Newcastle to Williams, 11 April 1755, BL Add MSS 32854, ff. 96–98; Williams to Holderness, 11 August, 13, 16 September 1755, AVPR. Snosheniia Angliei, 1755, OP d 770. ff. 196–227, 230–50. For the final agreement between London and St. Petersburg drawing substantially on Russian sources, see K.W. Schweizer, “The Anglo Russian Convention of 1755,” *International Military Encyclopedia* (Gulf Breeze, FL, 1999), 195–200.
 64. Newcastle to Williams, 11 April 1755, private, BL Add. MSS 32854, f. 97; Holderness to Dickens, 11 April 1755, SP 91/60; Holderness to Williams, 11 April 1755 (very secret, secret instructions, separate and secret, and public), *Ibid.*; minute, 17 April 1755 (second), BL Add. MSS 32996, ff. 79–80.
 65. Cabinet Minutes, 24 March, 22 April 1755, BL Add. MSS 32996, ff. 57, 89.
 66. Extract, Lieutenant Governor [Charles] Lawrence to Sir Thomas Robinson, 28 June 1755, *London Magazine*, 24(July 1755), 349–50; “Journal of the siege of Beausejour by Thomas Pichon” [Nova Scotia Archives, Halifax]. J.C. Webster, *Thomas Pichon, Spy of Beausejour*, (Sackville, 1937) published some of the documents. See also Collection de Fleury [BN], 2453, ff. 4–5; Frégault, *Canada*, 178–79.
 67. On Braddock’s expedition, see “A French Account of Braddock’s Defeat, 1755,” Chatham [Chatham Papers, TNA] 30/8/98; S. Pargellis, “Braddock’s Defeat,” *American Historical Review*, 41/2 (1936), 253–69; *idem.*, *Military Affairs in North America*, xvii; Frégault, *Canada*, 95–96; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 99–105. See also F. Nichols, “The Organization of Braddock’s Army,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 4/2 (1947), 125–47; P. Russell, “Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760,” *Ibid.*, 35/4 (1978), 642–43. On Boscawen’s capture of the *Alcide* and *Lys*, see Hardwicke to Newcastle, 14 July 1755, BL Add. MSS 32857, ff. 91–92; extract, *London Gazette* (15 July 1755) in *London Magazine*, 24(July 1755), 346a; Corbett, *England*, 53–58; diary entry, 15 July 1755, *Dodington Journal*, 308; A.T. Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power upon History* (Boston, MA 1890 [NY, 1987]), 284.

68. A. Beer, ed. "Denkschriften des Fürsten Wenzel Kaunitz-Rietberg," *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*, 48(Vienna, 1872), 19–38. See also McGill, "Roots of Policy," 243–44.
69. Newcastle to Holderness, 1 August 1755, private and particular, BL Add. MSS 32857, f. 501; Browning, *Newcastle*, 223–24; Clark, *Dynamics of Change*, 175–76; H. Walpole, Jr. [J. Brooke, ed.], *Memoirs of King George II* (New Haven, CT, 1985), 57–60.
70. Hardwicke to Newcastle, 9 August 1755, BL Add. MSS 32858, f. 76; Hardwicke to Newcastle, 12 August 1755, *ibid.* f.120; diary entry, 6 August 1755, *Dodington Journal*, 316. See also Newcastle to Hardwicke, 3 September 1755, most secret, BL Add. MSS 32858, ff. 413–15; Clark, *Dynamics of Change*, 177–89; Black, *Pitt*, 108–09.
71. Note the choice of wording in Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 September 1755, BL Add. MSS 32859, ff. 201–202. See also Clark, *Dynamics of Change*, 171–95.
72. See Note 71 and Batzel, "Treaties of Versailles," 82–90.
73. Note on the affair of the Hanoverian Soldier, in Carter, *Dutch Republic*, 50–68.
74. Clark, *Dynamics of Change*, 231ff.
75. Newcastle may have taken Austrian arrangements not merely as a matter of *Machtpolitik*, but also of personal betrayal. The rage he displayed in this particular instance appears only rarely throughout his voluminous correspondence. See Newcastle to Yorke, 11 June 1756, very private, BL Add. MSS 32865, ff. 257–66.
76. Cf. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 10 October 1756, BL Add. MSS 32868, ff. 164–65; Clark, *Dynamics of Change*, 240–46.
77. Frégault, *Canada*, 127–33; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 150–57. See the copy of an order book containing instructions to Montcalm for taking Fort Oswego, 1756, Military and Naval Division [Public Archives of Canada].
78. Frederick II to Field Marshal Keith, 23 June 1756, *Politische Correspondenz*, XII, 457; Mitchell to Holderness, 22, 26 June 1756, SP 90/65; Frederick II to Michell, 29 June, 6 July 1756, GStAPK Rep. 96. 32J–K, ff. 137, 143; Fox to Newcastle, 13 October 1756, BL Add. MSS 32868, f. 247; Fox's paper to the King, 13 October 1756, *Ibid.* ff. 303–04. See also Clark, *Dynamics of Change*, 264–76.
79. Browning, *Newcastle*, 27–28, 245; Hardwicke to Yorke, 31 October 1756; P.C. Yorke, *The Life and Correspondence of Phillip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke*, Volume II (Cambridge, 1913), 330–34.
80. Holderness's presence, in particular, may have saved the emerging alliance with Prussia. See Frederick II to Michell, 28 November 1756, GStAPK Rep. 96.32J–K, f. 300; Black, *Pitt*, 88.
81. Cf. Newcastle to Chesterfield, 8 June 1757, BL Add. MSS 32871, f. 240; Newcastle to Holderness, 8 June 1757, Holderness to Newcastle, 8 June 1757, three letters, *Ibid.*, ff. 242, 246, 248, 250; Paper laid before the King, 10 June 1757, *Ibid.*, ff. 272–73. Holderness to George II, 11 June 1757, BL Eg. MSS 3425, f. 46; Holderness to Lady Yarmouth, 11 Jun. 1757, *Ibid.*, ff. 48–50. See also Clark, *Dynamics of Change*, 415–17.
82. Most of the historiography suggests that Britain and France, with their weight of military, financial and diplomatic resources, ultimately forced the pace of peace negotiations at Aix la Chapelle in 1748, and that their influence abroad only seriously waned as emerging colonial disputes threatened to draw their allies into a new round of conflict. See M. Schumann, "British Grand Strategy and the Euro-Colonial International System" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Exeter, 2005), Chapter 1.
83. Clark, *Dynamics of Change*, 46–50, 68–69.
84. *Ibid.*, 73–74.
85. Hardwicke note to the King, 17 June 1757, BL Add. MSS 32871, f. 333; Hardwicke to Anson, 18 June 1757, in Douglas and Horn, *English Historical Documents*, 10, 113. See

- also Newcastle to Chesterfield, 29 June 1757, BL Add. MSS 32871, f. 444; Holderness to Newcastle, 30 June 1757 (very late), *Ibid.* f. 454.
86. Hardwicke to Newcastle, 28 July 1755, BL Add. MSS 32857, f. 398; Schweizer, *War, Politics and Diplomacy*, Chapter II.
 87. Newcastle to Holderness, 11 July 1755, BL Add. MSS 32857, f. 3; minute, 30 July 1755, *Ibid.*, ff. 491–93, 495–97.
 88. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 7 June 1755, BL Add. MSS 32855, ff. 381–83. The same letter reappears in BL Add. MSS 35414, ff. 272–74. See also Newcastle to Holderness, 13 June 1755, second letter, BL Add. MSS 32855, ff. 479–84; Holderness to Newcastle, 22 June 1755, most secret, BL Add. MSS 32856, ff. 93–97.
 89. Newcastle to Murray, 30 May 1756, BL Add. MSS 32865, f. 143. See also Clark, *Dynamics of Change*, 231.
 90. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 July 1755, BL Add. MSS 32857, f. 109. Also Hawke to Cleveland, 18 July 1755, from Spithead, ADM [Admiralty Archives, TNA] 1/89. On Hawke's exploits at sea, see *Ibid.*, *passim*.
 91. The rule itself came out much later, announced to the Dutch in Holderness to Yorke, 29 August 1758, SP 84/481. See also R. Pares, *Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739–1763* (Oxford, 1938), Chapters 3–4; Carter, *Dutch Republic*, 103, 109.
 92. See for example, Fraser, "Pitt-Newcastle Ministry"; Middleton, *Bells of Victory*; Schweizer, *War, Politics and Diplomacy*.
 93. Kelch, *Duke Without Money*.
 94. Memorials, 15 September 1761, BL Add. MSS 32928, ff. 187–88. This was more than seven times Britain's annual peacetime revenue earlier in the 1750s. See Browning, "Newcastle and Finance," 346.
 95. Browning, "Newcastle and Finance," 364 and *passim*.
 96. For example, Newcastle to Yorke, 13, 29 May 1760, BL Add. MSS 32906, ff. 29, 348–52; T [Treasury Archives, TNA] 29/33 *passim*.
 97. Browning, "Newcastle and Finance," 356, 376.
 98. *Ibid.*, 366–68, 376–77.
 99. *Ibid.*
 100. Cf. Albemarle to Newcastle, 11 September 1754, BL Add. MSS 32850, ff. 290–91; Points for Consideration with my Lord Chancellor [Hardwicke], 11 September 1754, BL Add. MSS 32995, ff. 318–19; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 21 September 1754, BL Add. MSS 35414, f. 193.
 101. Cf. J.F. Boshier, *The Canada Merchants, 1713–1763* (Oxford, 1987).
 102. Cf. for example, Richard Pares, "American versus Continental Warfare, 1739–1763," *English Historical Review*, 51/203 (1936), 429–65; J. Black, *America or Europe?: British Foreign Policy, 1739–63*. (London, 1998).
 103. Johnson, *His Officials*, 106–21; "Means by which Great Britain could serve itself by ruining its enemies' projects or rendering the war very difficult," attached to Mitchell to Keith, 9 December 1756, *Politische Correspondenz*, XIV, 121–23, point 3a.
 104. Vienna maintained a gazette reporting on public affairs, editorials, cartoons, and political pamphlets that enjoyed a much wider circulation in London. The Austrian domains simply knew no equivalent to the rancorous British press.
 105. Thus, in 1757, they apparently feared a British raid on Trieste. See Murray to Pitt, 10, 12 August, 9 September, 7 October 1757, SP 99/67.
 106. Newcastle to Albemarle, 5 September 1754, BL Add. MSS 32850, ff. 218–20.
 107. Thus, one may compare, for example, the portfolios of French ministers Moras [Navy], Paulmy [Army], and Bernis [Foreign Affairs]—all elevated with the help of Madame Pompadour in 1756–1757—with some appointments made under Newcastle's aegis,

including Henry Pelham [first lord of the Treasury, chancellor of the Exchequer and manager of the Commons], George Anson [first lord of the Admiralty]; John Ligonier [captain-general of the Army]; Hardwicke [lord chancellor], Holderness [secretary of state], and Halifax [president of the Board of Trade].

108. For starkly contrasting views of Frederick's claims to greatness, see Szabo, *Seven Years War in Europe* (against); Schumann and Schweizer, *Seven Years War* (cautiously in favour). To a lesser extent, this disagreement surfaced in two separate panels on Frederick the Great at the German Studies Association Annual Meeting, Pittsburgh, PA, 30 September–1 October 2006.

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